Economics Seminar（2014-02）
Topic: Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Speaker: Konrad O. Stahl
Affiliation: University of Mannheim
Time:Tuesday, 25 Feb. 14:00-15:30pm
Location:Room217, Guanghua Building 2
Abstract：
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and
continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic
bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers
rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had
the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and improved behavior—a
reduction in moral hazard—, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing
market transparency improves on market outcomes.We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and
continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic
bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers
rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had
the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and improved behavior—a
reduction in moral hazard—, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing
market transparency improves on market outcomes.We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and
continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic
bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers
rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had
the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and improved behavior—a
reduction in moral hazard—, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing
market transparency improves on market outcomes.
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and improved behavior—areduction in moral hazard—, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing market transparency improves on market outcomes.
Your participation is warmly welcomed!
